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Summary 
 
There is growing realization of the potential for games and experiments as powerful tools not only for 
research, but also for education and outreach. Experiments are particularly powerful and useful for fisher-
ies economists because (a) they can vividly illustrate some fundamental concepts and (b) are effective at 
testing the relative merits of various fishery management proposals.  Fisheries economists have developed 
a wide variety of games and experiments for a wide variety of applications.  However, many fisheries 
economists are unfamiliar with games and experiments and their potential applications. This two-part 
special session has a pair of complementary objectives:  (a) to demonstrate a range of games and experi-
ments to IIFET members who are unfamiliar with these methods so they can understand their potential for 
education, outreach and research; and (b) to provide an opportunity for existing developers and users of 
games and experiments to share new ideas for applications in fisheries. 
 
Introduction 
 
There is growing realization of the potential for games and experiments as powerful tools for education, 
outreach and research in many fields of economics and other sciences, and in particular for issues related 
to fisheries management. 
 
Games and experiments can be used for: 
 
  teaching economic principles to pupils, students or the general public; 
  outreach and communication with stakeholders in participatory assessment or management environ-
ments; 
  collecting scientific data in controlled research experiments. 
 
Games and experiments can be designed so that players’ or subjects’  incentives parallel those in fisher-
ies.  How players or subjects respond to incentives, and how their responses affect other players/subjects’ 
incentives, can be extremely instructive, leading to insights not easily attained from other approaches such 
as modelling. 
 
In popular perception, games tend to be viewed as “fun” and experiments tend to be viewed as “serious.”  
Actually, games and experiments can be the same thing:  there is no reason that a fun game can not also 
be a serious experiment, or vice versa.  The more “fun” a game is the greater the potential to seriously 
engage participants in thinking about the choices they are presented by the game. 
 
When designing games for educational purposes, the challenge is to structure stimulating and engaging 
environments that embed learning in ways that the player may not even be aware of the learning objec-
tives, yet learning is a necessary part of the game and a prerequisite for success. The issues related to the 
objectives and game design targeted towards education are quite similar to those useful when communi-
cating with regulators, policy makers or stakeholders. Participating in a role playing game can foster the IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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understanding of how different management regimes works, and may facilitate communication in situa-
tions where other ways of communication have failed. 
 
In fisheries economics many games have been developed for the use in classrooms and some have even 
found the way to the public (Fish Banks, Ltd, Meadows 2001), to teach principles and mechanisms, e.g. 
the common goods problem or game theory.  Role-playing games have been developed in the context of 
participatory management of land use or the use of marine resources (SimParc or ReefGame) and exhibit 
a strong tool for community based management approaches.  Games can also be used to derive strong 
scientific results, either as a tool (Foldit) or analysing the outcomes of many game sessions of the game 
(EcoTrade).  
 
Advances in computer technology are vastly expanding the potential to design games and experiments 
which are both fun and educational for participants and which shed real light on complex and important 
fisheries management issues, and to provide opportunities for large numbers of people to participate in 
these games at low cost.  
 
Theme Session - A: Demonstrations 
 
The Demonstrations session took place concurrent to the poster session, which gave a relaxed and fun 
atmosphere in which a large number of IIFET members were able both, to observe and take part in the 
three  games/experiments.  It  was a  great opportunity to introduce fisheries games  and  experiments to 
IIFET members who might not ordinarily think of games or experiments as being of interest or relevance 
to them and who might thus not attend an activity devoted exclusively to demonstrations of games and 
experiments.  
 
Within the session three games/experiments were on display; one very “low-tech” and the two others very 
“high tech.”  All three games/experiments have a wide variety of potential applications to teaching, com-
munication and research.   
 
In the “low-tech” game/experiment, developed by Professors James Murphy and Gunnar Knapp of the 
University of Alaska Anchorage, subjects engage in actual “fishing” by scooping beans from a large mix-
ing bowl (Knapp and Murphy, 2010).  This extremely simple and low-cost framework is fun for both par-
ticipants and observers—but it has numerous and surprisingly sophisticated applications for teaching, 
communication and research—particularly for illustrating the implications of different management regu-
lations.  For example, it has been used to demonstrate resource overexploitation in unregulated fisheries 
(in multi-period experiments, subjects “overfish” the bowl during early periods, sacrificing future harvest 
potential);  cost-driven  rent-dissipation  through  over-capitalization  in  limited  entry  fisheries  (subjects 
choose larger but higher-cost scoops in an effort to increase their catch shares); value-driven rent dissipa-
tion (subjects forego opportunities to obtain higher value for their fish which take more time and thus re-
duce their catch shares in competitive fisheries)—as well as the dramatic changes in all of these behaviors 
which result from the adoption of individual quotas. 
 
In one “high-tech” game/experiment, developed by Professors John Ledyard of the California Institute of 
Technology  and Theodore Groves of the University of California San Diego, a computer fishing game is 
used designed to acquaint players with (a) overfishing under open access, (b) how quotas (TAC) can re-
build stocks and rents and can be allocated initially in different ways that all lead to rebuilding stocks but 
with different distributional outcomes, and (c) how with trading of the quotas, greater efficiencies can be 
achieved.  The game is played on laptops or iPads hosted on a laptop with wireless local area network 
(LAN) connections to the players' devices.  Participants can use their own laptops or iPads.  Professors IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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Groves and Ledyard have demonstrated the game at international fishing industry workshops, and are fur-
ther refining it for further planned demonstrations for numerous industry groups. 
 
In the other “high-tech” game/experiment, developed by Dr. Jörn Schmidt and colleagues at Christian-
Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, players are fishermen in a sophisticated computer game played on a com-
puter screen in which they observe an “ocean” divided into a large number of “cells.”  Within each cell 
are fishery resources which grow over time and migrate or disperse to adjacent cells according to biologi-
cal growth and dispersion functions, and which can be depleted by fish harvests.  Players in the game con-
trol “boats” which can travel across the ocean to different cells and harvest fish with harvest rates and cost 
functions reflecting rates of travel and fish densities.  Hands-on demonstrations of the game at a special 
exhibition in the German Museum in Munich attracted extraordinary public interest.  Fascinating pictures 
and video of the game are available at www.ecocean.de.  As is immediately apparent to fisheries econo-
mist viewers, this sophisticated game has extremely powerful potential applications for education, com-
munication  and  research  about  issues  ranging  from  overfishing  to  marine  protected  areas  to  bycatch 
reduction.   
 
All three of these games attracted very high interest from IIFET participants and stimulated much discus-
sion about their potential applications and further development for teaching, outreach and research. It also 
formed a good basis for the second session the next day. 
 
Theme Session - B: Discussion 
 
The purpose of Part B (Discussion) was to provide an opportunity for IIFET members who have devel-
oped fisheries games and experiments to discuss the games and experiments and their applications.  In 
contrast to the Part A demonstrations, the objective of Part B was to provide an opportunity for develop-
ers and users of games and experiments to share new approaches for applying games and experiments to 
fisheries issues.  The Part A demonstrations attracted additional audience members interested in learning 
more about the potential for games and experiments. 
 
Part B had presentations about the three games/experiments demonstrated in Part A and a panel like dis-
cussion with the audience on further applications and other games in use. The questions raised with an-
swers from the presenters are listed below. 
 
Session Presentations 
 
ecoOcean - games in Fisheries education, communication and science 
Jörn Schmidt, Michel Magens, Dennis Nissen, Rudi Voss, Martin Quaas, Till Requate 
 
Games as tools for the mediation of learning contents, board games or computer games are not a novel 
idea. However the full potential of games and experiments as powerful tools for education, outreach and 
research especially in fields related to fisheries management has not fully explored yet. 
 
Games and experiments can be used for: 
 
  Teaching economic principles to students or the general public; 
  Outreach and communication with stakeholders in participatory assessment or management environ-
ments; 
  Collecting scientific data in controlled research experiments. 
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Games and experiments can be designed so that players’ or subjects incentives parallel those in fisheries.  
How players or subjects respond to incentives, and how their responses affect other players/subjects’ in-
centives, can be extremely instructive, leading to insights not easily attained from other approaches such 
as modelling. The use of role-playing games can foster the understanding of different perceptions and 
mediate communication, especially in situations where other ways of communication have failed. 
 
Role-playing games have been developed in the context of participatory management of land use (Sim-
Parc) or the use of marine resources (ReefGame) and exhibit a strong tool for community based manage-
ment approaches. In fisheries many games have been developed for the use in classrooms and student 
courses and some have even found the way to the public (Fish Banks, Ltd, Meadows 2001), to teach prin-
ciples and mechanisms, e.g. the common goods problem or game theory. Games can also be used to de-
rive strong scientific results, either as a tool (Foldit) or analysing the outcomes of many sessions of a 
game (EcoTrade). 
 
Here we will present a simple first game for the education of the broad public, ecoOcean and a conceptual 
framework for more complex games, which might be used for scientific experiments as well as for stake-
holder communication. 
 
Fishing for Beads: Simple Games, Serious Insights 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
 
A lot can be learned from observing behavior in simple, straightforward environments. The beads game is 
a simple, hand-run experiment that highlights the three sources of rent-dissipation in competitive fisher-
ies. Resource-driven rent dissipation results from overharvesting; cost-driven rent dissipation arises from 
excess use of inputs (over-capitalization) to harvest a fixed quantity; and value-driven rent dissipation 
occurs when there is a lack of careful handling which degrades quality and reduces prices. A primary goal 
in designing the beans game was simplicity, both in terms of understanding the rules and in deciding a 
strategy.  The game begins with a fixed quantity of beads in a bowl that is easily reached by all players. 
Each player can harvest beads into his/her own cup using a standard set of measuring spoons. Revenue is 
based on how many beads were harvested. In some variations of the game, the cost of the spoon (or har-
vesting technology) is deducted from the revenue. The beads game has been successfully tested with chil-
dren as young  as 6 years old, university  students, and representatives from the fishing industry. The 
robustness of the game comes from its real-time, transparent, and highly competitive environment. In 
demonstrations and research experiments, it is clear that participants are having fun while learning about 
fundamental concepts in managing fisheries. 
 
Quota: From Experimental computer Game to Fishery Management Education Tool 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard  
 
Quota, a computer-based simulation game, originated as an experimental game for testing alternative 
multi-resource management regimes or systems.  Highly flexible, it allows specification for a standard 
common-property, open-access fishery with user-specified bio-economic fishery growth model and mul-
tiple sized producers with individual harvest and cost functions.  In addition to demonstrating overfishing 
under open-access, various forms of Property Rights Systems can be implemented, including the setting 
of an overall Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and further allocation of the TAC to individual producers -- 
Individual Quota Rights (IQR) -- that may be based on historical catch during initial periods of Open Ac-
cess fishing or equal shares or shares determined by bargaining amongst the players (producers).  Subse-
quent trading of IQRs is also implemented using a highly developed computerized trading game.  Recent 
use of the game have been as an educational tool in university classes on resource economics and in the IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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field at meetings of Regional Fishing Management Organizations that govern the major tuna fisheries 
around the world. 
 
Session Discussion 
 
Real world fisheries are more complex and normally more than one assumption changes 
at a time: how to deal with that in a game context? 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
This is a challenge for any approach to modelling human behavior in a fishery, whether it’s developing a 
theoretical model, analysing data from an existing fishery, or developing a fisheries-related experiment. 
By keeping the game simple, we can focus on the key questions at hand without adding unnecessary 
complexity that could introduce confusion. If we think the complexity is a crucial element, then this could 
be added to the design and tested. No single experiment, and no single analysis of existing data will be 
sufficient to provide definitive answers to complex questions. Instead, research is an incremental process 
in which our understanding grows with each new study. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
While our game may be made more “realistic”, it would come at the cost of obscuring simple lessons.  
When useful (e.g. for showing how uncertainty about the stock can lead to unanticipated stock collapses, 
even when operating under a TAC), a particular “realistic” detail can be added to the game.  The point of 
the game is not to mimic reality, but to isolate features of reality and explore their implications for fishery 
management. 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
Of course you could envisage a game with a complexity near to reality. However, if you want to test for 
specific effects of changes, you need to restrict the changes within the game. If you play through a series 
of scenarios you can also imagine changing combinations of several assumptions at a time, e.g. like a 
setup of choice experiments. 
 
What about “unobservable” activities like illegal fisheries? Could you implement this in 
games? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
Of course! You can leave it open to the player to obey to restrictions like Total Allowable Catch or tem-
poral or spatial closings. You can also include measures like probability of being caught by a control or 
chance to be seen by other fishermen. The latter might be specifically interesting to investigate the effect 
of social peer pressure. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
In our game, fishermen are allowed to violate their individual catch limits, but are penalized for doing so.  
We can easily introduce a degree of uncertainty about whether or not their overfishing will be detected 
and then penalized.  Also, we can design into the model any particular degree of “leakage” due to illegal 
and undetected fishing.  What would be more difficult would be to introduce another decision variable to 
specify the level of enforcement activity that might be collectively agreed upon and undertaken. 
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Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
In our beads game, it would be easy to modify the rules to create the possibility of “illegal” activities such 
as  violating restrictions on gear choices,  harvest quotas or bycatch,  with some probability of getting 
caught and fined.  
 
What about auctioning and the effect of different auction designs? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
We have not yet included auctioning of quota in our game. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
This is a major goal of our game, namely to implement the auctioning of quota under different auction 
designs.  It will be incorporated into the game within the next few months.  Currently an internet-server 
based version of Quota does allow for experimenting with different auction designs, although it relies on 
accessing another software program. We are integrating this feature in our current, self-contained Mac, 
PC, iPad hardware platform. 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
Auctions are not the focus of our experiment, but it would not be hard to modify the game to auction the 
rights to individual harvest quotas.  
 
Could you implement the effect of politics in games? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
Maybe not in the games we presented here, but you can think of role-playing games, where you have to 
defend a specific position, e.g. stakeholders like fishermen or environmental organizations, you could also 
think of politician, e.g. representing different countries, as a role. I think it might be especially interesting 
to confront the player as a decision maker with different needs or demands of stakeholders to communi-
cate the need of trade offs and the difficulty in decision making. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
Another enhancement of Quota that is currently under development is the flexibility to halt the game to 
allow for periods of negotiation over details of the management system (e.g. the level of the TAC and 
how it is to be distributed).  These negotiation sessions would occur off-line and could be highly struc-
tured or completely unstructured.  The outcome of the negotiations would be a new set of parameters or 
specifications that would then be inputs to the paused game, which would be resumed under the new con-
figuration.  One can imagine all kinds of role-playing scenarios that could be specified for the negotiation 
phase that might reflect, more or less, real-world political issues.  But, while compatible with the game, 
per se, these considerations are not strictly embodied in the game and would require anyone using the 
game to design their own (or borrow from others) rules for the negotiations.  This might be considered a 
“feature”, though, and not a “bug”! 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
Our experiments were not designed to study the effects of politics in fisheries. It’s likely that our experi-
ment could be modified to test hypotheses about the political process, but this is not something we have 
considered. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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What about interaction between the people? They tend to change the behaviour when they 
can communicate? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
That is absolutely true. But you can actually design the game to test this, by prohibiting talking or by even 
separating the people spatially from each other. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
For experimental uses, the amount of communication permitted is tightly controlled and typically no 
communication is permitted, although for testing how communication may affect the outcome, various 
controls may be implemented.  For the kinds of educational uses of Quota that we have tried, we have not 
restricted communication at all, although it is naturally limited by the proximity of players and by time 
limits in which to make their game decisions.  Insofar as we can observe, say, the coordination of deci-
sions by players in a game, we are thus able to comment on this during the end-of-game discussion. 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
It has been well-documented that communication is incredibly effective at inducing cooperation in social 
dilemmas such as these. Typically we discourage pre-play communication, but we have also conducted 
experiments in which people are allowed to talk before the harvesting begins. In nearly all cases, the 
group develops a set of rules to minimize the competitive frenzy and maximize earnings. Defections from 
these voluntary agreements are incredibly rare. 
 
How are choices and behavior influenced by the set up of teams? Friends vs. strangers, 
are there consistent results? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
This is of course related to the previous question. However we have not tested this so far in our game. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
We have played the game with single person and multi-person teams, but this is more a matter of helping 
to overcome lack of familiarity with computer games.  We have not explored the effect of team composi-
tion.  This might be an interesting thing to do in the laboratory, however, before worrying about it in the 
field for educational purposes. 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
Our general impression, from watching many different groups of players, is that relationships do affect 
behaviour, including how aggressively players compete with each other.  This is, of course, what we 
would expect in “real-world” fisheries as well.  In fact, it would be interesting to formally test the effects 
of relationships among players upon their behaviour and strategies in the game, but this has not been im-
plemented so far. 
 
What about introducing things like lobbying, small vs. large-scale fisheries and gender? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
We have not included it in our game at the moment. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
While we have not explored any of these issues, in principle they can each be investigated although 
probably best in the experimental laboratory setting rather than in the field. 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
There already is a large literature in experimental economics which focuses on gender differences in 
competitive environments that would be relevant to our game. For example, one study in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics by Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund shows that although there are no gender 
differences in performance in a competitive environment, men are twice as likely to select a competitive 
compensation scheme rather than a noncompetitive scheme. In our beans game, it would be straightfor-
ward to test whether men are more likely to remain in a competitive derby fishery, rather than switch 
fishery managed with noncompetitive individual harvest quotas. 
 
Big Question: Who needs to learn what and how? Eg. do resource managers need to learn 
about the common pool resource? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
That is really a big question. I don’t know if resource managers need to learn about the common pool re-
source, but I am sure that the general public needs to learn about the complexity of fisheries and also the 
difficulty of making decisions. A game or simulation can also better inform the resource manager together 
with other stakeholders about possible effects of management measures. Rather then just assuming those 
effects you can play through possible scenarios and get the possibility to discuss them together.  
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
A very good question, indeed!  Our hypothesis (and justification for developing the game for educational 
use in the first place) is that all stakeholders in fisheries need to know the basic economic principles of: 
(a) the “tragedy of the commons”, i.e. open-access competitive fishing leads to overfishing, depleted 
stocks, and disappearing rents, (b) that limiting catch can, if done properly, restore fish stocks and in-
crease fish rents, (c) that creating property rights in catch shares is an efficient way to manage fisheries 
and that by judicious design through open, transparent, and fair negotiations property rights can be de-
fined to protect all interests, and (d) that allowing for trading of property rights can, if properly condi-
tioned, improve the values of all fishery stakeholders.  In general, we would like the game to convince all 
those needing convincing that institutional design of fishery management systems matter and that by 
drawing on the lessons of economics (and fishery biology) better management systems can be designed to 
lead to healthy, sustainable fisheries. 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
We agree that fishery managers and stakeholders need to understand the principles listed above by Theo-
dore Groves and John Ledyard.  What we would add is that there are different levels of learning and un-
derstanding.  It is one thing to understand these concepts theoretically.  What the games do is to help 
players (and observers) understand the concepts on a more immediate and fundamental level through ex-
periencing them directly.  When players see themselves dramatically “overfishing” and dissipating rents 
in competitive fisheries, and when they see how dramatically their own behaviour changes when the game 
rules change to create catch shares, they really begin to “get it.” Playing the game helps them understand 
better not only the theory they may learn in classrooms or from books, but also what they observe in real-
world fisheries.    IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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Where are links broken between what they should know and what they really do? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
I think a broken link is always the communication between all people involved in fisheries, fisheries sci-
ence and decision-making. To find alternative ways to support communication might, at least sometimes, 
be a way forward. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
We economists frequently take for granted that everyone understands basic economic principles.  This, 
we are often reminded in many important instances, is just not the case.  Unfortunately (in our view) there 
are fishery managers, government officials in charge of fisheries, and even fishermen themselves who do 
not understand the basic bio-economic realities of the fisheries in which they are engaged.  As a result, 
they rely on political, customary, and traditional ways for managing and operating in their fisheries, lead-
ing to unsustainable fisheries – both biologically and economically.  See our answer to the previous ques-
tion for what we think they should know. 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
People often think they know what they “should know” because they have studied it, or can even explain 
it.  But they many not really understand it unless they have experienced it.  The games help to provide 
that kind of experience.  This is particularly the case with some of the more subtle ways in which com-
petitive fisheries may dissipate economic rents.  Most people really do understand that overfishing a fish-
ery is inefficient and how and why competitive fisheries may be overfished.  But most people don’t 
understand instinctively how competitive fisheries can lead to rent dissipation through excess costs and 
foregone value.  The experience of playing or observing the games helps to fix these “broken links. 
 
The technology frontier 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
The technology is already quite advanced. Calculating even complex models is relatively fast and the de-
gree of complexity within games can be very high. Also the possibilities with respect on how to interact, 
e.g. even mobile phones or pads. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
The ubiquity of low-priced-high powered computing hardware presents an interesting trade-off.  On the 
one hand, it is becoming easier and easier to deploy advanced powerful technology in the field.  On the 
other hand, many of our “clients” (government fishery officials, fishermen, etc.) may not have had the 
opportunity to acquire the knowledge and sophistication in using advanced laptop computers, iPads, etc.  
This presents a challenge to us in attempting to use our game in some settings.  It can mean that we have 
to spend a fair amount of limited time just acquainting players with the basics of computer games.  Too 
much technological sophistication in the equipment and software can be self-defeating, if one is not care-
ful! 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
Advanced technologies present wonderful new opportunities for fisheries games.  That is why we are so 
excited to learn about our colleagues’ games.  But the downside of technology is the cost of the equip-
ment, programming and set-up time for the game.  All of these are minimal for our “low-tech” game, and IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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we can easily and quickly improvise new game variations.  And there is no mystery for the participants 
about what is going on:  they see exactly how everything works.  So we feel that there is great opportunity 
and benefit in both pushing the technology frontier as well as in playing “low-tech”games. 
 
How far can we go in gaining insights? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
I am convinced that you can gain great insights. If you develop an online strategic game version with a 
high level of complexity and a high number of players, you can impose management measures and record 
the change in behaviour. But the players will also gain insight in the system and implicitly learn facts and 
processes. If you use it to play with specific focus groups you can also see if there are differences between 
different reference groups or if some behaviour is universal. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
We see no limits in how far we can go in developing insights, in general.  The only limits we have are the 
time and resources required to develop and modify our tools (viz. our Quota game) to enable us to dem-
onstrate or teach the insights to others.  For ourselves, the ability to use the game in experiments provides 
opportunity for gaining insight that is limited only by our own imagination. 
 
Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
We can go a long way.  In theory we could mimic real-world fisheries better by developing more “realis-
tic” hands-on games—for example with remote-controlled toy boats fishing for real (small) fish in water 
tanks.  While fun to imagine, it is questionable whether the additional insights of going this far would be 
worth the cost.  Ultimately, while we can make games much more realistic, games can never teach us eve-
rything we need to know about fisheries.  Real fisheries will always be more complicated and the players 
will face more complicated incentives.   
 
How can we get those people who just like to mess up everything engaged? 
 
Jörn Schmidt 
This is always a challenge and it will depend on the situation. If you refer to online games, sometimes the 
only opportunity is to throw them out of the game, which is a common procedure in most online games. If 
it is in a focus group like situation and you really want to achieve a solution or common understanding 
then it might depend on your ability to facilitate. 
 
Theodore Groves, John Ledyard 
Of course, in attempting to show folks lessons about fisheries using our game, there may be some players 
who do not become engaged and play “randomly” or worse, attempt to cause mischief of one kind or an-
other.  Fortunately, if such players are relatively few, they have limited scope within our game to cause 
any problem and are easily identifiable.  Depending on the situation, peer pressure can be used to shame 
such individuals or deter them from destructive behaviour.  Or they can just be ignored without much 
loss.  Fortunately in our experience, this kind of extreme behaviour is extremely rare.  Almost everyone 
finds the game great fun and willingly gets into the spirit of the game. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Conference Proceedings 
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Gunnar Knapp, Jim Murphy 
We do observe that some participants don’t understand the games, or don’t take them seriously.  How-
ever, this occurs relatively rarely.  Peer pressure seems to be effective in stopping most bad behaviour, as 
well as the fact that usually the participants are volunteers. 
 
Reference to the webpage “games economists play” 
The webpage “games economists play” was mentioned as a general repository for small classroom games, 
which teach economic principles.   The site is at:  
http://www.marietta.edu/~delemeeg/games/ 
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